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Abstract
We consider a general equilibrium model of a private ownership economy with
consumption and production externalities. The choices of all agents (households and
firms) may affect utility functions and production technologies. The allocation of a
competitive equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. We provide an example showing that,
under standard assumptions, competitive equilibria are indeterminate in an open set
of the household’s endowments. We introduce the model with firms’ endowments,
in the spirit of Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii and Dre`ze (1990). In our model, firms’
endowments impact the technologies and the marginal productivities of the other
firms. We then prove that these economies are generically regular in the space of
endowments of households and firms.
JEL classification: C62, D51, D62.
Key words: externalities, private ownership economies, competitive equilibrium a`
la Nash, regular economies.
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1 Introduction
The Arrow–Debreu model of general equilibrium has been extended to economies
with consumption and production externalities. For such extensions, one has
to choose an equilibrium notion. From a normative point of view, markets
can be extended in order to obtain the two Fundamental Theorems of Wel-
fare Economics also for such economies, i.e., a perfect internalization of the
externalities. This is the idea sketched by Arrow (1969) and first analyzed by
Laffont (1976). They enlarge the choice sets of the agents and introduce per-
sonalized prices that agents face on markets for rights on the consumption and
production of any other agent in the economy. Recent contributions by Mag-
ill, Quinzii and Rochet (2015), and Cre`s and Tvede (2013), explore instead
corporate governance policies that induce firms to internalize the externali-
ties by maximizing some “social criterion” in order to increase the welfare of
stakeholders or shareholders, depending on their respective contribution. Their
analysis then focuses on legal systems that allow these goals to be achieved.
On the other hand, the positive theory of competitive equilibrium leads to
a definition of equilibrium that combines Arrow–Debreu with Nash, that is,
agents (households and firms) maximize their goals by taking as given both
the commodity prices and the choices of every other agent in the economy.
At equilibrium, agents’ optimal choices are mutually consistent and markets
clear. This is the notion given in Arrow and Hahn (1971), and Laffont (1988).
This notion includes as a special case the classical equilibrium definition with-
out externalities. With such an equilibrium notion, agents cannot choose the
consumption and production of other agents, i.e., externalities cannot be in-
ternalized, and competitive markets may prevent equilibrium allocations from
being Pareto optimal.
We consider a private ownership economy with a finite number of commodities,
households and firms. Utility and transformation functions may be affected
by the consumption and production activities of all other agents. We take
the conventional non-cooperative view of market equilibrium. Our purpose is
to provide the genericity of regular economies. We recall that an economy
is regular if it has a finite (odd) number of equilibria and every equilibrium
locally depends in a differentiable manner on the parameters describing the
economy. Therefore, the equilibria of a regular economy are locally unique
and persistent under small perturbations of the economy. Furthermore, at a
Sorbonne, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics, ad-
dress: Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75647
Paris Cedex 13, France, e-mail: Elena.delMercato@univ-paris1.fr; Vincenzo Platino,
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Naples Federico II and
CSEF, address: Via Cintia Monte S. Angelo, 80126 Napoli, Italy, e-mail: vin-
cenzo.platino@gmail.com.
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regular economy, it is possible to perform classical comparative statics, see
Smale (1981), Mas-Colell (1985), and Balasko (1988). Quite a few works deal
with the generic regularity of economies with externalities, see Cre`s (1996),
Bonnisseau (2003), Kung (2008), Mandel (2008), Bonnisseau and del Mercato
(2010), and Balasko (2015). However, with the exception of Mandel (2008),
all these authors focus on economies with externalities only on the consumer
side. 2
Apart from the intrinsic interest in a regularity result, regular economies are
also important for the study of Pareto improving policies in terms of taxes and
subsidies. In the presence of other sources of market failures, such as incom-
plete financial markets and public goods, there is a well established method-
ology for analyzing these policies, see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii and Dre`ze (1990), Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci
(1998), Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2006), Villanacci and Zenginobuz
(2006, 2012). Such a methodology applies to the set of regular economies, since
it requires equilibria to be differentiable maps of the fundamentals. Therefore,
our contribution provides a solid foundation for the analysis of these kinds of
policies in the presence of externalities, in the spirit of Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1986) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008). 3
We make basic assumptions on utility and transformation functions that are
standard in “smooth” equilibrium models without externalities. These as-
sumptions guarantee the non-emptiness and the compactness of the set of
equilibria. 4 However, even in the simpler case of consumption externalities,
they are not sufficient to establish classical generic regularity. For economies
with consumption externalities, establishing generic regularity requires the
introduction of an additional assumption on the second order effects of ex-
ternalities on individual utility functions, see Bonnisseau and del Mercato
2 Mandel (2008) makes use of the classical regularity result by assuming that the
demands and supplies that are mutually consistent are differentiable and their dif-
ferential is onto. Actually, the purpose of his paper is not the study of regularity, but
merely the existence of an equilibrium via the degree theory for correspondences.
3 The Pareto improving analysis of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) mainly focuses on
economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information. However, in Section
I, the authors consider a general equilibrium model of a private ownership economy
with consumption and production externalities. They assume that the aggregate
excess demand-supply function is differentiable and its differential is onto. Further-
more, the issue of the existence of such Pareto improving policies is not addressed for
the general model provided in Section I. In Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008),
the Pareto improving analysis deals with economies with consumption externalities
only.
4 Under these assumptions, the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty and com-
pact. The existence of a competitive equilibrium is demonstrated by Arrow and
Hahn (Chapter 6, 1971), Laffont (1977), and del Mercato and Platino (2015).
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(2010). 5 However, the analogous assumption on the effects of production ex-
ternalities on transformation functions is not going to work. We provide an
example of a private ownership economy with one household and two firms
where, despite well behaved second order external effects, equilibria are inde-
terminate in an open set of the household’s endowments (and the indetermi-
nacy is payoff relevant).
In order to overcome indeterminacy, we incorporate firms’ endowments in
the general model, in the spirit of Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii and Dre`ze
(1990). 6 Firms’ endowments consist of amounts of commodities held initially
by the firms. In our model, firms’ endowments have an impact on the produc-
tion sets of the other firms. Consequently, perturbing these endowments affects
the first and the second order effects of production externalities on transforma-
tion functions, thereby allowing us to establish generic regularity. 7 Our main
theorem (Theorem 16) states that competitive equilibria are determinate in
an open and full measure subset of the endowments of households and firms.
Most of the classical properties of the equilibrium manifold then hold true.
In order to prove Theorem 16, we adapt Smale’s approach to economies with
consumption and production externalities. Smale’s approach has been used
for other economic environments, see for instance Cre`s (1996), Cass, Siconolfi
and Villanacci (2001), Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005), and Bonnisseau and
del Mercato (2010). This approach is an alternative to the aggregate excess
demand-excess supply approach. Notice that in our economic environment,
the aggregate excess demand-excess supply approach is problematic. This is
because the individual demands and supplies are interdependent, making it
difficult to define the aggregate excess demand-excess supply out of equilib-
rium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the classical
model, basic assumptions and definitions. In Subsection 2.3, we discuss the
difficulties of establishing classical generic regularity. In Section 3, we provide
our example of indeterminacy and we analyze the second order external effects
in the example. Section 4 is devoted to our regularity result. We present our
model with firms’ endowments and we prove that these economies are regular
in an open and full measure subset of the endowments of households and firms.
All the lemmas are proved in Section 5. In Section 6, one finds classical results
5 In the absence of this assumption, these authors provide an example where equi-
libria are indeterminate for all initial endowments.
6 In Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii and Dre`ze (1990), there are no direct external-
ities in preferences and production sets. However, their model exhibits pecuniary
externalities arising from the incompleteness of financial markets.
7 We do not rely on logarithmic or quadratic perturbations of the payoff functions
that are commonly used to establish generic regularity in non-cooperative games,
see for instance Harsanyi (1973), Ritzberger (1994), and van Damme (2002).
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from differential topology used in our analysis and the Jacobian matrix of the
equilibrium function.
2 The general model
We consider a private ownership economy. There is a finite number of com-
modities labeled by the superscript c ∈ C := {1, . . . , C}. The commodity
space is RC . There are a finite number of firms labeled by the subscript
j ∈ J := {1, . . . , J} and a finite number of households labeled by the subscript
h ∈ H := {1, . . . , H}.
The production plan of firm j is yj := (y
1
j , .., y
c
j , .., y
C
j ). As usual, if y
c
j > 0 then
commodity c is produced as an output, if y`j < 0 then commodity ` is used
as an input. The production plan of firms other than j is y−j := (yf )f 6=j, and
let y := (yj)j∈J . The consumption of household h is xh := (x1h, .., x
c
h, .., x
C
h ).
The consumption of households other than h is x−h := (xk)k 6=h, and let x :=
(xh)h∈H.
The production set of firm j is described by a transformation function tj.
8 The
main innovation of this paper is that the transformation function tj may de-
pend on the production and consumption activities of all other agents. That
is, tj describes both the technology of firm j and the way in which its tech-
nology is affected by the activities of the other agents. More precisely, for a
given externality (y−j, x), the production set of the firm j is
Yj(y−j, x) :=
{
yj ∈ RC : tj(yj, y−j, x) ≤ 0
}
where tj is a function from RC × RC(J−1) × RCH++ to R. Let t := (tj)j∈J .
The preferences of household h are described by a utility function,
uh : (xh, x−h, y) ∈ RC++ × RC(H−1)+ × RCJ −→ uh(xh, x−h, y) ∈ R
uh(xh, x−h, y) is the utility level of household h associated with (xh, x−h, y).
That is, uh also describes the way in which the preferences of household h are
affected by the activities of the other agents. Let u := (uh)h∈H.
8 This is a convenient way to represent a production set using an inequality on
a function called the transformation function. In the case of a single-output tech-
nology, the production set is commonly described by a production function. The
transformation function is the counterpart of the production function in the case
of production processes which involve several outputs, see for instance Mas-Colell
et al. (1995) and Villanacci et al. (2002).
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The endowment of household h is eh := (e
1
h, .., e
c
h, .., e
C
h ) ∈ RC++, and let e :=
(eh)h∈H. The total resources are r :=
∑
h∈H
eh ∈ RC++. The share of firm j owned
by household h is sjh ∈ [0, 1], and let s := (sjh)j∈J ,h∈H. As usual,
∑
h∈H
sjh = 1
for every firm j ∈ J . A private ownership economy is E := ((u, e, s), t).
The price of one unit of commodity c is pc ∈ R++, and let p := (p1, .., pc, .., pC).
Given w = (w1, .., wc, .., wC) ∈ RC , denote w\ := (w1, .., wc, .., wC−1) ∈ RC−1.
2.1 Basic assumptions
In this subsection, we make the following set of assumptions to establish the
non-emptiness and the compactness of the equilibrium set.
Assumption 1 For all j ∈ J ,
(1) The function tj is a C
2 function.
(2) For every (y−j, x) ∈ RC(J−1) × RCH++ , tj(0, y−j, x) = 0.
(3) For every (y−j, x) ∈ RC(J−1) × RCH++ , the function tj(·, y−j, x) is differ-
entiably strictly quasi-convex, i.e., for all y′j ∈ RC, D2yj tj(y′j, y−j, x) is
positive definite on KerDyj tj(y
′
j, y−j, x).
9
(4) For every (y−j, x) ∈ RC(J−1)×RCH++ , Dyj tj(y′j, y−j, x) 0 for all y′j ∈ RC.
Fixing the externalities, the assumptions on tj are standard in smooth general
equilibrium models. Points 1 and 4 of Assumption 1 imply that the production
set is a C2 manifold of dimension C and its boundary is a C2 manifold of
dimension C − 1. Point 2 of Assumption 1 states that inaction is possible.
Consequently, using standard arguments from profit maximization, the wealth
of household h associated with his endowment eh ∈ RC++ and his profit shares is
strictly positive for every price p ∈ RC++. Thus, one deduces the non-emptiness
of the interior of the individual budget constraint. Point 3 of Assumption 1
implies that the production set is strictly convex. Furthermore, if the profit
maximization problem has a solution then it is unique, because the function
tj(·, y−j, x) is continuous and strictly quasi-convex. We remark that tj is not
required to be quasi-convex with respect to all the variables, i.e., we do not
require the production set to be convex with respect to the externalities. Point
9 Let v and v′ be two vectors in Rn, v · v′ denotes the scalar product of v and v′.
Let A be a real matrix with m rows and n columns, and B be a real matrix with
n rows and l columns, AB denotes the matrix product of A and B. Without loss of
generality, vectors are treated as row matrices and A denotes both the matrix and
the following linear mapping A : v ∈ Rn → A(v) := AvT ∈ R[m] where vT denotes
the transpose of v and R[m] := {wT : w ∈ Rm}. When m = 1, A(v) coincides with
the scalar product A · v, treating A and v as vectors in Rn.
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4 of Assumption 1 implies that the function tj(·, y−j, x) is strictly increasing
and so the production set satisfies the classical “free disposal” property.
Remark 2 Our analysis holds true if some commodities are not involved in
the technological process of firm j. In this case, for every firm j, one defines the
set Cj of all the commodities c ∈ C that are involved in the technological process
of firm j, where Cj denotes the cardinality of the set Cj with 2 ≤ Cj ≤ C.
The production plan of firm j is then defined as yj := (y
c
j)c∈Cj ∈ RCj and the
transformation function tj is a function from RCj ×
∏
f 6=j
RCf × RCH++ to R. In
this case, all the assumptions on the transformation functions are written just
replacing RC × RC(J−1) × RCH++ by RCj ×
∏
f 6=j
RCf × RCH++ . Furthermore, in the
definition of a competitive equilibrium, one also adapts the market clearing
condition for every commodity c by considering only firms that use commodity
c in their technological process. That is, for every commodity c, the sum over
j ∈ J is replaced by the sum over j ∈ J (c) := {j ∈ J : c ∈ Cj}.
Given (x, y) ∈ RCH++ ×RCJ , the set of the production plans that are consistent
with the externality (x, y) is defined by
Y (x, y) := {y′ ∈ RCJ : tj(y′j, y−j, x) ≤ 0, ∀ j ∈ J } (1)
The next assumption provides a boundedness condition on all the sets of
feasible production plans that are consistent with the externalities. 10
Assumption 3 (Uniform Boundedness) Given r ∈ RC++, there exists a
bounded set C(r) ⊆ RCJ such that for every (x, y) ∈ RCH++ × RCJ ,
Y (x, y) ∩ {y′ ∈ RCJ : ∑
j∈J
y′j + r  0} ⊆ C(r)
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Assumption 3.
Lemma 4 Given r ∈ RC++, there exists a bounded set K(r) ⊆ RCH++ × RCJ
such that for every (x, y) ∈ RCH++ ×RCJ , the following set is included in K(r).
A(x, y; r) := {(x′, y′) ∈ RCH++ × RCJ : y′ ∈ Y (x, y) and
∑
h∈H
x′h −
∑
j∈J
y′j ≤ r}
10 Assumption 3 is analogous to several conditions used to establish the existence
of an equilibrium with externalities in production sets, that is, the boundedness
condition given in Arrow and Hahn (1971), page 134 of Section 2 in Chapter 6;
Assumption UB (Uniform Boundedness) in Bonnisseau and Me´decin (2001); As-
sumption P(3) in Mandel (2008); Assumption 3 in del Mercato and Platino (2015).
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It is well known that the boundedness of the set of feasible allocations is a cru-
cial condition for proving the existence of an equilibrium. However, Assump-
tion 3 is a stronger version of the standard boundedness condition used for
economies without externalities, because it guarantees that the set of feasible
allocations A(x, y; r) is uniformly bounded with respect to the externalities. It
means that the bounded set K(r) that includes the set of feasible allocations
is independent of the externality effects. In particular, it implies the bounded-
ness of the set of feasible allocations that are mutually consistent, i.e., the set
F(r) = {(x, y) ∈ RCH++×RCJ : tj(yj, y−j, x) ≤ 0, ∀ j ∈ J and
∑
h∈H
xh−
∑
j∈J
yj ≤
r}. Notice that in order to prove the existence of an equilibrium it would not
be sufficient to assume only the boundedness of the set F(r). 11
Assumption 5 For all h ∈ H,
(1) The function uh is continuous in its domain and C
2 in the interior of its
domain.
(2) For every (x−h, y) ∈ RC(H−1)++ × RCJ , the function uh(·, x−h, y) is diffe-
rentiably strictly increasing, i.e., Dxhuh(x
′
h, x−h, y) 0 for all x′h ∈ RC++.
(3) For every (x−h, y) ∈ RC(H−1)++ × RCJ , the function uh(·, x−h, y) is diffe-
rentiably strictly quasi-concave, i.e., for all x′h ∈ RC++, D2xhuh(x′h, x−h, y)
is negative definite on KerDxhuh(x
′
h, x−h, y).
(4) For every (x−h, y) ∈ RC(H−1)+ × RCJ and for every u ∈ Imuh(·, x−h, y),
clRC{xh ∈ RC++ : uh(xh, x−h, y) ≥ u} ⊆ RC++
Fixing the externalities, the assumptions on uh are standard in smooth general
equilibrium models. Point 3 of Assumption 5 implies that the upper contour
sets are strictly convex. Consequently, if the utility maximization problem has
a solution then it is unique. Notice that uh is not required to be quasi-concave
with respect to all the variables, i.e., we do not require preferences to be
convex with respect to the externalities. Point 4 of Assumption 5 implies the
classical Boundary Condition (BC), i.e., the closure of the upper counter sets
is included in RC++.
Notice that in Points 1 and 4 of Assumption 5, we allow for consumption
externalities x−h on the boundary of the set RC(H−1)++ in order to handle the
11 In Chapter 6 of Arrow and Hahn (1971), the authors have recognized the need
to assume the boundedness of a wider set of feasible production allocations than
the ones that are mutually consistent, in order to extend their existence proof to
the case of externalities. In Bonnisseau and Me´decin (2001), Assumption UB is
needed to find the cube to compactify the economy in order to use fixed point
arguments. Assumption P(3) in Mandel (2008) or Assumption 3 in del Mercato and
Platino (2015) are used to show that the set of feasible allocations is bounded once
externalities move along a homotopy arc.
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behavior of uh as consumption externalities approach the boundary. Points
1 and 4 of Assumption 5 imply that BC is still valid whenever consumption
externalities converge to zero for some commodities. 12 This property is used
to prove properness properties of the equilibrium set (see Step 2 of the proof
of Lemma 17 in Section 5). If uh does not satisfy BC whenever consumption
externalities converge to zero for some commodities, we provide below an
alternative assumption on uh from which one still gets Step 2 in the proof
of Lemma 17, while maintaining Points 1 and 4 of Assumption 5 only for
consumption externalities in RC(H−1)++ . 13
(5) There exists δ > 0 such that for every (x−h, y) ∈ RC(H−1)++ × RCJ and
for every (xh, x
′
h) ∈ R2C++, if uh(xh, x−h, y) > uh(x′h, x−h, y), then uh(xh, x−h +
δ1, y) ≥ uh(x′h, x−h + δ1, y) where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ RC++. 14
2.2 Competitive equilibrium and equilibrium function
In this subsection, we provide the definition of competitive equilibrium and
the notion of equilibrium function.
We use commodity C as the “numeraire good”. Given p\ ∈ RC−1++ , let p :=
(p\, 1) ∈ RC++.
Definition 6 (Competitive equilibrium) (x∗, y∗, p∗\) ∈ RCH++×RCJ×RC−1++
is a competitive equilibrium for the economy E if for all j ∈ J , y∗j solves the
following problem
max
yj∈RC
p∗ · yj
subject to tj(yj, y
∗
−j, x
∗) ≤ 0
(2)
12 A simple example of utility function that satisfies this property is given by any
additively separable function uh(xh, x−h) = u˜h(xh) + vh(x−h) where u˜h is defined
on RC++ and satisfies the classical BC, and vh is defined on R
C(H−1)
+ .
13 For example, consider two commodities and the utility function uh(x
1
h, x
2
h, x
1
k) :=
x1hx
2
hx
1
k where (x
1
h, x
2
h) ∈ R2++ and x1k ∈ R+. This function does not satisfy BC
whenever the externality x1k converges to zero, but it satisfies Point 5.
14 A simple example of utility function that satisfies Point 5 is given by any multi-
plicatively separable function uh(xh, x−h) = u˜h(xh)mh(x−h) where u˜h is defined on
RC++ and mh(x−h) > 0 for every x−h ∈ RC(H−1)++ .
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for all h ∈ H, x∗h solves the following problem
max
xh∈RC++
uh(xh, x
∗
−h, y
∗)
subject to p∗ · xh ≤ p∗ · (eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhy
∗
j )
(3)
and (x∗, y∗) satisfies market clearing conditions, that is∑
h∈H
x∗h =
∑
h∈H
eh +
∑
j∈J
y∗j (4)
The proof of the following proposition is standard, because in problems (2)
and (3) each agent takes as given both the price and the choices of every other
agent in the economy.
Proposition 7
(1) From Assumption 1, if y∗j is a solution to problem (2), then it is unique
and it is completely characterized by KKT conditions. 15
(2) From Point 2 of Assumption 1 and Assumption 5, there exists a unique
solution x∗h to problem (3) and it is completely characterized by KKT
conditions.
(3) As usual, from Point 2 of Assumption 5, household h’s budget constraint
holds with an equality. Thus, at equilibrium, due to the Walras law, the
market clearing condition for commodity C is “redundant”. So, one re-
places condition (4) with
∑
h∈H
x
∗\
h =
∑
h∈H
e
\
h +
∑
j∈J
y
∗\
j .
Let Ξ := (RC++×R++)H×(RC×R++)J×RC−1++ be the set of endogenous varia-
bles with generic element ξ := (x, λ, y, α, p\) := ((xh, λh)h∈H, (yj, αj)j∈J , p\)
where λh denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with household h’s bud-
get constraint, and αj denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with firm
j’s technological constraint. We describe the competitive equilibria associated
with the economy E using the equilibrium function FE : Ξ→ Rdim Ξ,
FE (ξ) := ((F
h.1
E (ξ) , F
h.2
E (ξ))h∈H, (F
j.1
E (ξ) , F
j.2
E (ξ))j∈J , F
M
E (ξ)) (5)
where F h.1E (ξ) := Dxhuh(xh, x−h, y)−λhp, F h.2E (ξ) := −p ·(xh−eh−
∑
j∈J
sjhyj),
F j.1E (ξ) := p − αjDyj tj(yj, y−j, x), F j.2E (ξ) := −tj(yj, y−j, x), and FME (ξ) :=∑
h∈H
x
\
h −
∑
j∈J
y
\
j −
∑
h∈H
e
\
h.
The vector ξ∗ = (x∗, λ∗, y∗, α∗, p∗\) ∈ Ξ is an extended equilibrium for the
economy E if and only if FE (ξ
∗) = 0. We simply call ξ∗ an equilibrium.
15 “KKT conditions” means Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions.
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Theorem 8 (Existence and compactness) The equilibrium set F−1E (0) is
non-empty and compact.
del Mercato and Platino (2015) provide a proof of Theorem 8.
2.3 Regular economies
We recall below the formal notion of regular economy.
Definition 9 (Regular economy) E is a regular economy if FE is a C
1
function and 0 is a regular value of F , i.e., for every ξ∗ ∈ F−1E (0), the diffe-
rential mapping DξFE(ξ
∗) is onto.
Using Smale’s approach, the definition of regular economy becomes a very in-
telligible notion. The fact that the Jacobian matrix DξFE(ξ
∗) is non-singular
simply means that the linear approximation at ξ∗ of the non-linear equilib-
rium system FE(ξ) = 0 has a unique solution. Then, applying the Implicit
Function Theorem, around ξ∗, the solution of the equilibrium system is a dif-
ferentiable mapping of the parameters describing the economy. Furthermore, if
the equilibrium set F−1E (0) is non-empty and compact, as a consequence of the
Regular Value Theorem (Corollary 22 in Subsection 6.1), one easily deduces
that a regular economy has a finite number of equilibria.
In the presence of externalities, the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy
cannot be excluded by making standard assumptions. Indeed, the equilibrium
notion given in Definition 6 has the characteristics described in what follows.
All the agents take as given both the price and the choice of every other
agent in the economy. Given the price and the choices of the other agents,
the individual optimal solutions are completely determined. But, for a given
price, the equilibrium allocation ((x∗h)h∈H, (y
∗
j )j∈J ) is a Nash equilibrium, and
the problem is that, under standard assumptions, one may get indeterminacy
in Nash equilibrium. We illustrate the reason below.
Consider the equilibrium function FE defined in (5). The economy E remains
fixed, thus we omit the subscript E. The price p\ is fixed. Consider all the
equilibrium equations except the L− 1 market clearing conditions by defining
the following function G.
G(q) := ((F h.1(q, p\), F h.2(q, p\))h∈H, (F j.1(q, p\), F j.2(q, p\))j∈J )
where q := (x, λ, y, α) = ((xh, λh)h∈H, (yj, αj)j∈J ), so that we write ξ as (q, p\).
Every q∗ = ((x∗h, λ
∗
h)h∈H, (y
∗
j , α
∗
j )j∈J ) such that G(q
∗) = 0 provides the indi-
vidual demands and supplies ((x∗h)h∈H, (y
∗
j )j∈J ) that are mutually consistent
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at the price p\.
Consider the Jacobian matrix of that system, that is,
DqG(q
∗) := Dq((F h.1(q∗, p\), F h.2(q∗, p\))h∈H, (F j.1(q∗, p\), F j.2(q∗, p\))j∈J )
(6)
In the absence of externalities, the Jacobian matrix DqG(q
∗) is non-singular. 16
This is because the transformation and utility functions are respectively dif-
ferentiably strictly quasi-convex and strictly quasi-concave in the individual
choice. Then, the Implicit Function Theorem implies that, locally, the indi-
vidual demands and supplies are a C1 mapping of the price.
It turns out that, in the presence of externalities, under standard assumptions,
the Jacobian matrix DqG(q
∗) is not necessarily non-singular. Consequently,
the individual demands and supplies ((x∗h)h∈H, (y
∗
j )j∈J ) that are mutually con-
sistent may not be a differentiable mapping of the price. The matrix DqG(q
∗)
may fail to be nonsingular due to the presence of some of the following effects:
(1) the second order external effects on utility functions arising from the
derivatives of F h.1(q, p\) with respect to (x−h, y),
(2) the second order external effects on transformation functions arising from
the derivatives of F j.1(q, p\) with respect to (y−j, x),
(3) the first order external effects on transformation functions arising from
the derivatives of F j.2(q, p\) with respect to (y−j, x).
In economies without externalities, all these effects are equal to zero.
One might believe that if the utility and transformation functions are re-
spectively differentiably strictly quasi-convex and strictly quasi-concave with
respect to all the variables (i.e., individual choice and externalities), then the
matrix DqG(q
∗) is non-singular. This belief is wrong, since the matrix DqG(q∗)
does not actually involve the whole Hessian matrix of the utility and transfor-
mation functions. The matrix DqG(q
∗) involves only a partial block of rows
of those Hessian matrices. This is because the first order effects of external-
ities on utility and transformation functions do not appear in the first order
conditions associated with the individual maximization problems, i.e., in the
system G(q) = 0.
In the case of pure exchange economies with externalities, Bonnisseau and del
Mercato (2010) have introduced a specific assumption on the second order ex-
ternal effects on utility and possibility functions. 17 We adapt their assumption
on utility functions to our framework.
16 Then, the matrix DξFE(ξ
∗) is trivially non-singular for almost all initial endow-
ments, and one gets the generic regularity in the space of households endowments.
17 The possibility functions represent general consumption sets with externalities.
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Assumption 10 (Bonnisseau and del Mercato, 2010) Let (x, y) ∈ RCH++×
RCJ such that the gradients (Dxhuh(xh, x−h, y))h∈H are positively collinear. Let
v ∈ RCH such that ∑
h∈H
vh = 0 and vh ∈ KerDxhuh(xh, x−h, y) for every h ∈ H.
Then, vh
∑
k∈H
D2xkxhuh(xh, x−h, y)(vk) < 0 whenever vh 6= 0.
We refer to Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010) for the interpretation of this
assumption and an example of utility functions that satisfy this assumption.
Notice that Assumption 10 does not require the Hessian matrix of uh (with
respect to all the variables) to be positive definite on KerDuh(xh, x−h, y).
That is, uh is not required to be differentiably strictly quasi-concave with
respect to all the variables. We face positive forms that may induce to think
of strict quasi-concavity, but actually in Assumption 10 one takes into account
only a partial block of rows of the Hessian matrix of uh. Assumption 10 is in
the same spirit as the assumption of diagonally strict concavity introduced in
Rosen (1965) on a weighted sum of the payoff functions of the agents. However,
compared with the condition of Theorem 6 of Rosen (1965), Assumption 10
is easier to read, it does not involve any vector of weights and it focuses only
on directions (vh)h∈H that sum to zero where vh is orthogonal to the gradient
Dxhuh(xh, x−h, y).
Under Assumption 10, the classical result of generic regularity holds true if
there are no externalities in the production sets.
In the presence of external effects on the production side, an assumption on
the transformation functions analogous to Assumption 10 is not sufficient for
establishing generic regularity in the space of households’ endowments. 18 This
is shown in the next section by means of an example.
3 Infinitely many competitive equilibria: An example
In the previous section, we have explained why standard arguments for the
genericity of regular economies may not apply to economies with externalities.
In this section, we provide an example of a private ownership economy with one
household and production externalities between two firms where equilibria are
indeterminate in an open set of the household’s endowments. In the example,
we get infinitely many equilibria because there are infinitely many mutually
consistent supplies. Importantly, this allocations indeterminacy translates into
a “price relevant indeterminacy”. That is, one gets infinitely many equilibrium
18 Further research is open to find some kind of auxiliary assumption on the first
order effects of externalities on transformation functions. In Section 4, we choose
another approach.
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prices, and consequently the indeterminacy has an impact on the welfare of
the economy.
Example. There are two commodities. There is one household, x = (x1, x2)
denotes the consumption of the household, e = (e1, e2) is his initial endowment
and the utility function is given by u(x1, x2) = x1x2. Therefore, there are no
externalities on the consumption side and then Assumption 10 is obviously
satisfied.
There are two firms, the production plan of firm j is yj = (y
1
j , y
2
j ). Without loss
of generality, for simplicity of exposition, the subscript f denotes the subscript
−j, so that the production plan of the firm other than j is yf = (y1f , y2f ). Both
firms use commodity 2 to produce commodity 1.
The production technology of firm j is affected by the production plan of the
other firm in the following way. Given yf , the production set of firm j is
Yj(yf ) = {yj ∈ R2 : y2j ≤ 0 and y1j ≤ fj(y2j , yf )}
where the production function fj is defined by fj(y
2
j , yf ) := 2φ(yf )
√
−y2j with
φ(yf ) :=

y1f
2
√
−y2f
if y2f < −ε2
y1f
2ε
if y2f ∈ [−ε2, 0]
where 0 < ε < 1. The production function fj is not completely smooth with
respect to the externality. 19 But, it goes in the essence of the problem.
For every firm j = 1, 2, Assumption 1 is satisfied for every externality yf =
(y1f , y
2
f ) with y
1
f > 0 and y
2
f < −ε2. Therefore, in what follows,
(1) we focus on equilibria where the amounts of output are strictly positive
and the amounts of input are strictly lower than −ε2,
(2) φ(yf ) is then given by
y1f
2
√
−y2f
according to the definition above.
The price of commodity 2 is normalized to 1. By Definition 6, we have that
(x∗, y∗1, y
∗
2, (p
∗, 1)) is a competitive equilibrium if for every j = 1, 2, y∗j solves
max
y1j>0, y
2
j<−ε2
p∗y1j + y
2
j
subject to y1j − 2φ(y∗f )
√
−y2j ≤ 0
19 In order to get a smooth approximation, one might approximate the function φ
around −ε2 by a polynomial function.
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x∗ solves the following problem
max
x∈R2++
x1x2
subject to p∗x1 + x2 ≤ p∗e1 + e2 +
2∑
j=1
(p∗y∗1j + y
∗2
j )
(7)
and markets clear.
For each firm j = 1, 2, let αj be the Lagrange multiplier associated with
firm j’s technological constraint. The KKT conditions associated with firm j’s
maximization problem are given by
p∗ = αj, 1 =
αjφ(y
∗
f )√
−y2j
y1j = 2φ(y
∗
f )
√
−y2j
Consequently, one gets the following equilibrium equations for every j = 1, 2,
y∗2j = −(p∗)2[φ(y∗f )]2 and y∗1j = 2p∗[φ(y∗f )]2
and one easily deduces that, at equilibrium,
y∗11 = y
∗1
2 = −
2y∗22
p∗
and y∗21 = y
∗2
2 for any y
∗2
2 < −ε2 (8)
Thus, at equilibrium, the aggregate profit is given by pi∗ := −2y∗22 and the
optimal solution of the household is given by
x∗1 =
1
2p∗
(p∗e1 + e2 + pi∗) and x∗2 = p∗x∗1 (9)
Using the market clearing condition for commodity 2, the equilibrium price is
p∗ =
e2 + 6y∗22
e1
(10)
Notice that p∗ > 0 if and only if y∗22 > −
e2
6
. Therefore, using (8), (9) and (10),
any bundle
(x∗, y∗1, y
∗
2, (p
∗, 1)) with y∗22 ∈
]
−e
2
6
,−ε2
[
is a competitive equilibrium. Thus, for all initial endowments that belong to
the open set {e = (e1, e2) ∈ R2++ : e2 > 6ε2} we get infinitely many equilibria
parametrized by y∗22 .
We now show that the economy of the example exhibits well behaved second
order external effects. For this purpose, we provide below the condition on the
transformation functions analogous to Assumption 10.
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Let (x, y) ∈ RCH++ × RCJ such that tj(yj, y−j, x) = 0 for every j ∈ J and
the gradients (Dyj tj(yj, y−j, x))j∈J are positively collinear. Let z ∈ RCJ
such that
∑
j∈J
zj = 0 and zj ∈ KerDyj tj(yj, y−j, x) for every j ∈ J . Then,
zj
∑
f∈J
D2yfyj tj(yj, y−j, x)(zf ) > 0 whenever zj 6= 0.
If there are no external effects, this condition is satisfied because tj is dif-
ferentiably strictly quasi-convex in yj. Therefore, the sign of the inequality
is strictly positive, whereas in Assumption 10 the analogous sign is strictly
negative since uh is differentiably strictly quasi-concave in xh.
Consider the previous example. For every firm j, the transformation function
is given by tj(yj, yf ) = y
1
j − 2φ(yf )
√
−y2j . As above, we focus on production
plans for which φ(yf ) is given by
y1f
2
√
−y2f
.
Take z = (z1, z2) ∈ R4 such that
z1 + z2 = 0 (11)
and zj ∈ KerDyj tj(yj, yf ). Then, one gets
z1j = −
φ(yf )√
−y2j
z2j (12)
We compute below the two matrices involved in the condition above,
D2yj tj(yj, yf ) =

0 0
0
φ(yf )
2(−y2j )
√
−y2j
 , D2yfyj tj(yj, yf ) =

0 0
φ(yf )
y1f
√
−y2j
φ(yf )
2(−y2f )
√
−y2j

Using (11) and (12), it is an easy matter to compute zjD
2
yj
tj(yj, yf )(zj) +
zjD
2
yfyj
tj(yj, yf )(zf ) which is given by 1
(−y2j )
+
1√
−y2j
√
−y2f
− 1
(−y2f )
 φ(yf )
2
√
(−y2j )
(z2j )
2 (13)
Since zj 6= 0, from (12) we have that z2j 6= 0 . Since the gradients (Dyj tj(yj, yf ))j=1,2
are positively collinear, one gets y1j = y
1
f . Then y
2
j = y
2
f , because tj(yj, yf ) = 0
for every j = 1, 2. Therefore, the quantity in (13) becomes
y1j
4(−y2j )2
(z2j )
2
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which is strictly positive.
4 The general model with firms’ endowments
In order to establish generic regularity, we incorporate firms’ endowments in
the model of Section 2. Every firm j is endowed with an exogenously given
vector of commodities ηj := (η
1
j , .., η
c
j , .., η
C
j ), where η
c
j denotes the amount of
commodity c held initially by firm j. Let η := (ηj)j∈J ∈ RCJ . Notice that in
the revised version accepted for publication in Economic Theory (forthcoming
2017), we consider only positive firms’ endowments. However, our results also
apply for negative firms’ endowments, under a suitable survival condition given
in Assumption 12 below. As for the interpretation of negative endowments,
we refer to Subsection 1.3.2 in Arrow and Debreu (1954). That is, we may
extend ηcj to include all debts payable in terms of commodity c. Debts owed
to firm j are positive, debts owed by firm j are negative. 20
For every j, the total production plan yj introduced in the market by
firm j is given by
yj := y
′
j + ηj (14)
where y′j is the production decision of firm j according to its technology and
the externality (y−j, x), that is, y′j ∈ Yj(y−j, x). Notice that in Yj(y−j, x), the
production externality is the total production plan y−j = y′−j +η−j introduced
in the market by firms other than j, and not the production decision y′−j of
firms other than j. That is, in our model firm j’s decision y′j is constrained
by its technology and its technology is affected by the total production plans
introduced in the market by the other firms. This seems reasonable in many
economic applications.
Remark 11 One could consider a different model where the production exter-
nality is the production decision y′−j of firms other than j, i.e., y
′
j ∈ Yj(y′−j, x).
In this case, despite the presence of firms’ endowments, one obtains the same
Jacobian matrix DqG(q
∗) as in (6) of Subsection 2.3. In other words, firms’
endowments do not impact the technologies of the other firms. Therefore, per-
turbing the endowments η does not affect firms’ supplies. Moreover, as regards
market clearing conditions, perturbing the endowments η is completely redun-
dant, i.e., it has exactly the same effect as perturbing the endowments e, be-
cause household h’s budget constraint and market clearing conditions are given
20 If ηj is negative, then p·ηj represents a cost for firm j, i.e., a penalty. For instance,
in the literature of game theory, adding penalties to the payoff functions of the
agents has been often used to restore the generic regularity of Nash equlibria, see
for instance van Damme (2002).
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by p · (xh − eh −
∑
j∈J
sjh(y
′
j + ηj)) = 0 and
∑
h∈H
x
\
h −
∑
j∈J
(y′j + ηj)
\ − ∑
h∈H
e
\
h = 0.
Consequently, this way of introducing firms’ endowments does not lead to the
result of generic regularity.
Given the price p ∈ RC++ and the externality (y−j, x) ∈ RC(J−1) × RCH++ , the
optimal production decision of firm j solves the following problem
max
y′j∈RC
p · y′j
subject to tj(y
′
j, y−j, x) ≤ 0
We write this problem in terms of the total production plan yj introduced in
the market by firm j, that is,
max
yj∈RC
p · yj
subject to tj(yj − ηj, y−j, x) ≤ 0
(15)
Problem (15) is equivalent to the previous maximization problem, because
y′j = yj − ηj by (14) and firm j takes as given its endowment ηj. Therefore,
introducing firms’ endowments entails a displacement of the argument of the
transformation function tj.
The return from firm j generated by the price p, the production decision y′j
and the endowment ηj is given by p · (y′j + ηj). We write this return in terms
of the total production plan introduced in the market by firm j, that is, p · yj.
According to the behavior of each firm j, we are led to introduce the following
notation:
tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj) := tj(yj − ηj, y−j, x) (16)
Notice that the function tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj) satisfies all the assumptions given in
Assumption 1 except Point 2. However, yj = ηj acts for tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj) as
yj = 0 acts for tj(yj, y−j, x). Indeed, Point 2 of Assumption 1 implies that
tj(ηj, y−j, x; ηj) = 0, and then using standard arguments for profit maximiza-
tion, one gets p · y∗j ≥ p · ηj whenever y∗j solves problem (15). The individual
wealth of household h associated with his endowment and his shares on the
returns from the firms is given by p · (eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhy
∗
j ). Consequently, the indi-
vidual wealth of household h is greater than p ·(eh+
∑
j∈J
sjhηj) which is strictly
positive if eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhηj  0. Then, in the following assumption we focus on
the set of endowments (e, η) for which eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhηj  0 for every h ∈ H,
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from which one deduces the non-emptiness of the interior of all the individual
budget constraints.
Assumption 12 (Survival Assumption) (e, η) belongs to the following set.
E := {(e, η) ∈ RCH++ × RCJ : eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhηj  0, ∀ h ∈ H}
We assume below that Assumption 3 (Uniform Boundedness) is satisfied in
some open subset of endowments of households and firms. The following as-
sumption is used to prove non-emptiness and properness properties of the
equilibrium set, see the proof of Lemma 15 and Step 1 of the proof of Lemma
17 in Section 5.
Assumption 13 There exists an open set Λ ⊆ E such that Assumption 3 is
satisfied for every r ≥ ∑
j∈H
eh +
∑
j∈J
ηj with (e, η) ∈ Λ.
Remark 14 In the setting of Remark 2, for every firm j the initial endow-
ment ηj belongs to the set RCj . In this case, in Assumptions 12 and 13, RCJ
is replaced by
∏
j∈J
RCj , and for every commodity c ∈ C the sum over j ∈ J is
replaced by the sum over j ∈ J (c).
From now on,
(1) t = (tj)j∈J is fixed and satisfies Assumption 1 and Assumption 13,
(2) u = (uh)h∈H is fixed and satisfies Assumptions 5 and 10,
(3) a private ownership economy is completely parametrized by the endow-
ments of households and firms (e, η) in the open set Λ given in Assumption
13,
(4) we simply denote Fe,η the equilibrium function associated with an econ-
omy (e, η) ∈ Λ.
Competitive equilibrium and equilibrium function. The notions of
competitive equilibrium and equilibrium function given in Subsection 2.2 are
adapted to the economy (e, η) according to the behavior of firm j given in
(15) and the notations introduced in (14) and (16). More precisely, in Defi-
nition 6, one replaces tj(yj, y
∗
−j, x
∗) with tj(yj, y∗−j, x
∗; ηj). Consequently, the
equilibrium function Fe,η coincides with the equilibrium function defined in
(5), except for the first order conditions associated with problem (15) which
are replaced by
F j.1e,η (ξ) := p− αjDyj tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj) and F j.2e,η (ξ) := −tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj)
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Under the previous assumptions one gets the result analogous to Theorem 8.
The proof of the following lemma is given in Section 5.
Lemma 15 For every (e, η) ∈ Λ, the equilibrium set F−1e,η (0) is non-empty
and compact.
4.1 The regularity result
In this subsection, we provide and we prove our main theorem.
Theorem 16 The set Λ∗ of regular economies (e, η) is an open and full mea-
sure subset of Λ.
In order to prove this theorem, we introduce the following notations and we
provide two auxiliary lemmas, namely Lemmas 17 and 18. Both lemmas are
proved in Section 5.
Point 1 of Assumption 1 and Point 1 of Assumption 5 imply that the equi-
librium function Fe,η is C
1 everywhere. By Definition 9, the economy (e, η) is
regular if
∀ ξ∗ ∈ F−1e,η (0), rankDξFe,η(ξ∗) = dim Ξ
Define the following set
G :=
{
(ξ, e, η) ∈ F−1(0) : rankDξF (ξ, e, η) < dim Ξ
}
where the function F : Ξ× Λ→ Rdim Ξ is defined by
F (ξ, e, η) := Fe,η(ξ)
and denote Π the restriction to F−1(0) of the projection of Ξ× Λ onto Λ, i.e.
Π : (ξ, e, η) ∈ F−1(0)→ Π(ξ, e, η) := (e, η) ∈ Λ
We can now write the set Λ∗ given in Theorem 16 as
Λ∗ = Λ \ Π(G)
So, in order to prove Theorem 16, it is enough to show that Π(G) is a closed
set in Λ and Π(G) is of measure zero.
We first claim that Π(G) is a closed set in Λ. From Point 1 of Assumptions
1 and 5, F and DξF are continuous on Ξ × Λ. The set G is characterized
by the fact that the determinant of all the square submatrices of DξF (ξ, e, η)
of dimension dim Ξ is equal to zero. Since the determinant is a continuous
function and DξF is continuous on F
−1(0), the set G is closed in F−1(0).
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Thus, Π(G) is closed since the projection Π is proper. 21 The properness of the
projection Π is provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 17 The projection Π : F−1(0)→ Λ is a proper function.
To complete the proof of Theorem 16, we claim that Π(G) has measure zero
in Λ. The result follows by Lemma 18 given below and a consequence of Sard’s
Theorem (Theorem 23 in Subsection 6.1). Indeed, Lemma 18 and Theorem
23 imply that there exists a full measure subset Ω of Λ such that for each
(e, η) ∈ Ω and for each ξ∗ such that F (ξ∗, e, η) = 0, rankDξF (ξ∗, e, η) = dim Ξ.
Now, let (e, η) ∈ Π(G), then there exists ξ ∈ Ξ such that F (ξ, e, η) = 0 and
rank DξF (ξ, e, η) < dim Ξ. So, (e, η) /∈ Ω. This prove that Π(G) is included
in the complementary of Ω, that is in ΩC := Λ \ Ω. Since ΩC has measure
zero, so too does Π(G). Thus, the set of regular economies Λ∗ is a full measure
subset of Λ since Ω ⊆ Λ∗, which completes the proof of Theorem 16.
Lemma 18 0 is a regular value for F .
Finally, one easily deduces the following proposition from Lemma 15 and The-
orem 16, using a consequence of the Regular Value Theorem (Corollary 22 in
Subsection 6.1) and the Implicit Function Theorem.
Proposition 19 (Properties of a regular economy) For each (e, η) ∈ Λ∗,
(1) the equilibrium set associated with the economy (e, η) is a non-empty finite
set, i.e.
∃ r ∈ N \ {0} : F−1e,η (0) = {ξ1, ..., ξr}
(2) there exists an open neighborhood I of (e, η) in Λ∗, and for each i =
1, . . . , r there exist an open neighborhood Ui of ξ
i in Ξ and a C1 function
gi : I → Ui such that
(a) Ui ∩ Uk = ∅ if i 6= k,
(b) gi(e, η) = ξ
i and ξ′ ∈ F−1e′,η′(0) holds for (ξ′, e′, η′) ∈ Ui× I if and only
if ξ′ = gi(e′, η′).
We conclude this section by remarking that most of the classical properties
of the equilibrium manifold and the natural projection are established for the
model studied in this section. 1) For any given economy, the equilibrium set
is non-empty and compact (Lemma 15). 2) For any given economy, the topo-
logical degree modulo 2 of the equilibrium function is equal to 1 (Lemma 10
in Mercato and Platino, 2015). 22 Consequently, one gets that, at every regular
economy, the number of equilibria is odd. 3) The properness of the natural
21 See Definition 24 in Subsection 6.1.
22 The proof of Lemma 10 of del Mercato and Platino (2015) have been adapted to
our model in the proof of Lemma 15.
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projection (Lemma 17). 4) 0 is a regular value of the equilibrium function
(Lemma 18). Consequently, the equilibrium set is a sub-manifold of the same
dimension as the space of the parameters describing the economy. 5) The local
differentiability of the associated equilibrium selection map (Proposition 19).
5 Proofs
In this section, we prove all the lemmas stated in Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 15. The compactness of the equilibrium set is a direct con-
sequence of Lemma 17. For the existence of an equilibrium it suffices to adapt
the proof of Lemma 10 given in del Mercato and Platino (2015) by replacing
the transformation functions tj(yj, y−j, x) with the functions tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj).
Notice that the functions tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj) satisfy all the assumptions given in
Assumption 1 except Point 2. Whenever Point 2 of Assumption 1 is invoked
in the proof of Lemma 10 of del Mercato and Platino (2015), the production
plan yj = 0 is replaced by yj = ηj which acts for tj(yj, y−j, x; ηj) as yj = 0
acts for tj(yj, y−j, x). Furthermore, whenever Lemma 4 is invoked in the proof
of Lemma 10 of del Mercato and Platino (2015), the bounded set K(r) given
by Lemma 4 is replaced by the set K(r˜) + η˜ where r˜ := r +
∑
j∈J
ηj and η˜ :=
(0, η) which is bounded by Assumption 13. Finally, in order to complete the
adaptation of the proof of Lemma 10 of del Mercato and Platino (2015), one
also adapts in the following way the proof of Proposition 15 in del Mercato
and Platino (2015). Namely, in Step 1.2 of Proposition 15, one replaces the
point êh(τ
ν) with the point τ ν(eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhηj) + (1 − τ ν)x˜h, and in Step 2.2,
one replaces the point êh(τ
ν) with the point eh +
∑
j∈J
sjhηj.
Proof of Lemma 17. We show that any sequence (ξν , eν , ην)ν∈N ⊆ F−1(0),
up to a subsequence, converges to an element of F−1(0), knowing that the
sequence Π(ξν , eν , ην)ν∈N = (eν , ην)ν∈N ⊆ Λ converges to some (e∗, η∗) ∈ Λ.
We recall that ξν = (xν , λν , yν , αν , pν\).
Step 1. Up to a subsequence, (xν , yν)ν∈N converges to (x∗, y∗) ∈ RCH+ × RCJ .
For every j ∈ J and ν ∈ N, define the following production plan
y′νj := y
ν
j − ηνj (17)
F j.2(ξν , eν , ην) = 0 and the definition given in (16) imply tj(y
′ν
j , y
ν
−j, x
ν) = 0.
Then, y′ν = (y′νj )j∈J belongs to the set Y (y
ν , xν) defined in (1). Summing
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F h.2(ξν , eν , ην) = 0 over h, from FM(ξν , eν , ην) = 0 one gets
∑
h∈H
xνh−
∑
j∈J
yνj =∑
h∈H
eνh for all ν ∈ N. Consequently, using (17) we have that
∑
h∈H
xνh −
∑
j∈J
y′νj =
∑
h∈H
eνh +
∑
j∈J
ηνj
for every ν ∈ N. Now, for every commodity c consider the following compact
set Qc := {∑
h∈H
eνch +
∑
j∈J
ηνcj : ν ∈ N} ∪ {
∑
h∈H
e∗ch +
∑
j∈J
η∗cj } and define
rc := maxQc and r := (rc)c∈C
From the equality above,
∑
h∈H
xνh −
∑
j∈J
y′νj ≤ r for all ν ∈ N, and r ≥
∑
h∈H
e∗h +∑
j∈J
η∗j by definition. Consequently, Assumption 13 implies that the sequence
(xν , y′ν)ν∈N is included in the bounded set K(r) given by Lemma 4, because
(xν , y′ν) belongs to the set A(xν , yν ; r) for every ν ∈ N. Thus, the sequence
(xν , y′ν)ν∈N is included in the compact set clK(r) and, up to a subsequence,
it converges to some (x∗, y′∗) ∈ RCH+ × RCJ . Finally, from (17) it follows that
the sequence (yν)ν∈N converges to y∗ := y′∗ + η∗ which completes the proof of
the step.
Step 2. The consumption allocation x∗ is strictly positive, i.e. x∗  0. Define
the bundle ê∗h := e
∗
h +
∑
j∈J
sjhη
∗
j which is strictly positive by Assumption 12.
We show that for every h ∈ H, x∗h belongs to the closure of the following set
{xh ∈ RC++ : uh(xh, x∗−h, y∗) ≥ uh(ê∗h, x∗−h, y∗)} (18)
which is included in RC++ by Point 4 of Assumption 5. Thus, x∗h  0.
By F h.1(ξν , eν , ην) = F h.2(ξν , eν , ην) = 0 and KKT sufficient conditions, xνh
solves the following problem for every ν ∈ N.
max
xh∈RC++
uh(xh, x
ν
−h, y
ν)
subject to pν · xh ≤ pν · eνh + pν ·
∑
j∈J
sjhy
ν
j
We claim that the point êνh := e
ν
h+
∑
j∈J
sjhη
ν
j belongs to the budget constraint of
the problem above. Notice that êνh  0 by Assumption 12. By F j.1(ξν , eν , ην) =
F j.2(ξν , eν , ην) = 0 and KKT sufficient conditions, yνj solves the following
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problem for every ν ∈ N.
max
yj∈RC
pν · yj
subject to tj(yj, y
ν
−j, x
ν ; ηνj ) ≤ 0
Point 2 of Assumption 1 and the definition given in (16) imply tj(η
ν
j , y
ν
−j, x
ν ; ηνj ) =
0, and so pν ·yνj ≥ pν ·ηνj for every j. Thus, one gets pν ·(eνh+
∑
j∈J
sjhy
ν
j ) ≥ pν · êνh
which completes the proof of the claim. Therefore, for every ν ∈ N
uh(x
ν
h, x
ν
−h, y
ν) ≥ uh(êνh, xν−h, yν)
By Point 2 of Assumption 5, for every ε > 0 we have that uh(x
ν
h+ε1, x
ν
−h, y
ν) >
uh(ê
ν
h, x
ν
−h, y
ν) where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ RC++. So, taking the limit for ν → +∞
and using the continuity of uh, one gets
uh(x
∗
h + ε1, x
∗
−h, y
∗) ≥ uh(ê∗h, x∗−h, y∗)
since (êνh)ν∈N converges to ê
∗
h. Thus, for every ε > 0 the point (x
∗
h+ε1) belongs
to the set defined in (18), which implies that x∗h belongs to the closure of this
set.
Step 3. Up to a subsequence, (λν , pν \)ν∈N converges to some (λ∗, p∗ \) ∈
RH++×RC−1++ . By F h.1 (ξν , eν , ην) = 0, fixing commodity C, for every ν ∈ N we
have λνh = DxCh uh(x
ν
h, x
ν
−h, y
ν). Taking the limit over ν, by Points 1 and 2 of
Assumption 5, we get λ∗h := DxCh uh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗) > 0.
By F h.1 (ξν , eν , ην) = 0, for all commodity c 6= C and for all ν ∈ N we
have pν c =
Dxc
h
uh(x
ν
h, x
ν
−h, y
ν)
λνh
. Taking the limit over ν, by Points 1 and 2 of
Assumption 5, we get p∗ c :=
Dxc
h
uh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗)
λ∗h
> 0. Therefore, p∗ \  0.
Step 4. Up to a subsequence, (αν)ν∈N converges to some α∗ ∈ RJ++. For every
firm j, fix a commodity c(j) ∈ C. By F j.1 (ξν , eν , ην) = 0, for every ν ∈ N we
have that ανj =
pν c(j)
D
y
c(j)
j
tj(yνj , y
ν−j, xν ; ηνj )
which is strictly positive by Point 4 of
Assumption 1. Taking the limit, by Points 1 and 4 of Assumption 1, we get
α∗j :=
p∗ c(j)
D
y
c(j)
j
tj(y∗j , y∗−j, x∗; η∗j )
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 18. We show that for each (ξ∗, e∗, η∗) ∈ F−1(0), the Ja-
cobian matrix Dξ,e,ηF (ξ
∗, e∗, η∗) has full row rank. It is enough to prove that
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∆Dξ,e,ηF (ξ
∗, e∗, η∗) = 0 implies ∆ = 0, where
∆ := ((∆xh,∆λh)h∈H, (∆yj,∆αj)j∈J ,∆p\) ∈ RH(C+1) × RJ(C+1) × RC−1
The computation of Dξ,e,ηF (ξ
∗, e∗, η∗) is described in Subsection 6.2 and the
system ∆Dξ,e,ηF (ξ
∗, e∗, η∗) = 0 is written in detail below.
We remind that

(1)
∑
h∈H
∆xhD
2
xkxh
uh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗)−∆λkp∗ −
∑
j∈J
α∗j∆yjD
2
xkyj
tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j )+
−∑
j∈J
∆αjDxktj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j ) + ∆p
\ [IC−1|0] = 0, ∀ k ∈ H
(2) −∆xh · p∗ = 0, ∀ h ∈ H
(3)
∑
h∈H
∆xhD
2
yfxh
uh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗) +
∑
h∈H
∆λhsfhp
∗ −∑
j∈J
α∗j∆yjD
2
yfyj
tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j )+
−∑
j∈J
∆αjDyf tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j )−∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0, ∀ f ∈ J
(4) −∆yj ·Dyj tj(y∗j , y∗−j, x∗; η∗j ) = 0, ∀ j ∈ J
(5) ∆λhp
∗ −∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0, ∀ h ∈ H
(6) − ∑
h∈H
λ∗h∆x
\
h −
∑
h∈H
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h −
∑
j∈J
sjhy
∗\
j ) +
∑
j∈J
∆y
\
j = 0
(7) − α∗j∆yjD2ηjyj tj(y∗j , y∗−j, x∗; η∗j )−∆αjDηj tj(y∗j , y∗−j, x∗; η∗j ) = 0, ∀ j ∈ J
Using the definition given in (16), we have that
Dηj tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j ) = −Dyj tj(y∗j , y∗−j, x∗; η∗j ) and
D2ηjyj tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j ) = −D2yj tj(y∗j , y∗−j, x∗; η∗j )
Then, for every j ∈ J equation (7) becomes
α∗j∆yjD
2
yj
tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j ) + ∆αjDyj tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j ) = 0
Multiplying the equation above by ∆yj and using equation (4), since α
∗
j > 0
one gets ∆yjD
2
yj
tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j )(∆yj) = 0. So, equation (4) and Point 3
of Assumption 1 imply ∆yj = 0. Then, the equation above implies that
∆αjDyj tj(y
∗
j , y
∗
−j, x
∗; η∗j ) = 0, and so ∆αj = 0 by Point 4 of Assumption
1. Thus, (∆yj,∆αj) = 0 for every j ∈ J .
Since p∗C = 1, from equation (5) one gets ∆λh = 0 for all h ∈ H, and so
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∆p\ = 0. Thus, the above system becomes
(1)
∑
h∈H
∆xhD
2
xkxh
uh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗) = 0, ∀ k ∈ H
(2) −∆xh · p∗ = 0, ∀ h ∈ H
(3)
∑
h∈H
∆xhD
2
yfxh
uh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗) = 0, ∀ f ∈ J
(6) −∑
h∈H
λ∗h∆x
\
h = 0
(19)
F h.1(ξ∗, e∗, η∗) = 0 and equation (2) in system (19) imply that ∆xh ∈ KerDxhuh(x∗h, x∗−h, y∗)
for every h ∈ H. Now, for every h ∈ H define vh := λ∗h∆xh. Thus, the vector
(x∗h, vh)h∈H satisfies the following conditions.
(vh)h∈H ∈
∏
h∈H
KerDxhuh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗) and
∑
h∈H
vh = 0 (20)
where the last equality comes from equation (6) in system (19). Multiplying
by vk both sides of equation (1) in system (19) and using the definition of
vh, one gets
∑
h∈H
vh
λ∗h
D2xkxhuh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗)(vk) = 0 for every k ∈ H. Summing up
k ∈ H, we obtain ∑
h∈H
vh
λ∗h
∑
k∈H
D2xkxhuh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗)(vk) = 0. F h.1(ξ∗, e∗, η∗) = 0
implies that the gradients (Dxhuh(x
∗
h, x
∗
−h, y
∗))h∈H are positively proportional.
So, by (20) all the conditions of Assumption 10 are satisfied, and then vh = 0
for each h ∈ H since λ∗h > 0. Thus, we get ∆xh = 0 for all h ∈ H, and
consequently ∆ = 0 which completes the proof.
6 Appendix
6.1 Regular values and transversality
The theory of general equilibrium from a differentiable view is based on results
from differential topology. First, we remind the definition of a regular value.
Second, we summarize the results used in our analysis. These results, as well
as generalizations on these issues, can be found for instance in Guillemin and
Pollack (1974), Mas-Colell (1985) and Villanacci et al. (2002).
Definition 20 Let M , N be Cr manifolds of dimensions m and n, respec-
tively. Let f : M → N be a Cr function with r ≥ 1. An element y ∈ N is a
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regular value for f if for every x∗ ∈ f−1(y), the differential mapping Df(x∗)
is onto.
Theorem 21 (Regular Value Theorem) Let M , N be Cr manifolds of dimen-
sions m and n, respectively. Let f : M → N be a Cr function with r ≥ 1. If
y ∈ N is a regular value for f , then
(1) if m < n, f−1(y) = ∅,
(2) if m ≥ n, either f−1(y) = ∅, or f−1(y) is an (m − n)-dimensional sub-
manifold of M .
Corollary 22 Let M , N be Cr manifolds of the same dimension. Let f :
M → N be a Cr function with r ≥ 1. Let y ∈ N a regular value for f such
that f−1(y) is non-empty and compact. Then, f−1(y) is a finite subset of M .
The following results is a consequence of Sard’s Theorem for manifolds.
Theorem 23 (Transversality Theorem) Let M , Ω and N be Cr manifolds of
dimensions m, p and n, respectively. Let f : M × Ω → N be a Cr function,
assume r > max{m−n, 0}. If y ∈ N is a regular value for f , then there exists
a full measure subset Ω∗ of Ω such that for any ω ∈ Ω∗, y ∈ N is a regular
value for fω, where
fω : ξ ∈M → fω(ξ) := f(ξ, ω) ∈ N
Definition 24 Let (X, d) and (Y, d′) be two metric spaces. A function pi :
X → Y is proper if it is continuous and one among the following conditions
holds true.
(1) pi is closed and pi−1(y) is compact for each y ∈ Y ,
(2) if K is a compact subset of Y , then pi−1(K) is a compact subset of X,
(3) if (xn)n∈N is a sequence in X such that (pi(xn))n∈N converges in Y , then
(xn)n∈N has a converging subsequence in X.
The conditions above are equivalent.
6.2 Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium function
The computation of Dξ,e,ηF (ξ
∗, e∗, η∗) is described below. Vectors are treated
as row matrices. The symbol “T” means transpose. 0 denotes the zero vector.
With innocuous abuse of notation, the dimension of 0 is C or C−1 depending
on the dimension of the respective block of columns. 0 denotes the zero matrix.
With innocuous abuse of notation, the size of 0 is C × C or (C − 1) × (C −
1) depending on the size of the respective block of rows and columns. Î :=
[IC−1|0T ](C−1)×C where IC−1 denotes the identity matrix of size (C − 1).
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